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Insanity of the Condemned
Virtually every state that authorizes the death penalty' has adopted
by case law, 2 statute, 3 or implication, 4 the common law rule prohibit-
ing the use of that sanction against an insane prisoner. Although
I. Eleven states no longer inflict the punishment of death as a criminal sanction. Two
of these states have explicitly abolished capital punishment. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 46;
W. VA. CODE § 61-11-2 (1977). Nine other states authorize either life imprisonment or
substantial prison terms as the maximum criminal penalty. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.010
(1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 706-660 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West Supp. 1978);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West
Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605 (1975); S.D.
COuP. LAWs ANN. § 22-6-1 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West Supp. 1978). These 11
states are not relevant to the discussion in this Note and are, therefore, not included in
any subsequent compilations of state procedures.
2. Four states have adopted in their case law the common law rule against executing
the insane. State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 515, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 90-91, 135 S.V. 327,
329-30 (1910); State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940) (dictum).
3. Twenty-five states have enacted statutory procedures explicitly requiring that con-
victed prisoners not be executed while insane. ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1975); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4021 to -4024 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1964); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 3700-3704.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1977); FLA.
STAT. §§ 922.06-.07 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2601 to -2604 (1978); Act of July 26, 1972,
Pub. Act No. 77-2097, § 5-2-3, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-3 (Smith-Hurd 1973); KAN.
STAT. § 22-4006 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 202A.190, 431.240 (1977 & Supp. 1978);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 (1976); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 48 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 552.050-.060 (Vernon Supp.
1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 95-501 to -509, 95-2304 to -2305 (1969 & Supp. 1977);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2537 to -2539 (1975); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 176.415-.455 (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:165-11 to -12 (West 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-14-3 to -7 (1964); N.Y.
CoRREc. LAw §§ 655-657 (McKinney Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2949.28-.30 (Page
1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1004-1008 (West 1958); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 26-4-9 to -13
(1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-36-8 to -12 (1953 & Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-13-901 to
.903 (1977).
4. Six state statutes simply require the transfer of any insane convicted prisoners from
prison to a state mental hospital. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 27-23-101 to -102 (1973 & Supp.
1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1-1.1-59, 16-14-8-1 to -3
(Bums 1973 & Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-65.1 to .5, 122-85 (1974 & Supp. 1975);
S.C. CODE §§ 44-23-210 to -220 (1976 & Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 19.2-177 (1975). In at least
one of these states, this type of provision has been construed to protect insane convicted
prisoners from execution. Timmons v. Peyton, 240 F. Supp. 749, 763 (E.D. Va. 1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
Two states provide only that the governor is empowered to suspend executions. IDAHO
CODE § 19-2708 (1948 & Supp. 1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:24 (1970). However, Idaho
dictates that the English common law is applicable in all courts of the state, absent a
specific statutory provision, IDAHO CODE § 73-116 (1973), and the common law provides
that no insane person can be executed, see p. 535 & note 11 infra. New Hampshire, on
the other hand, creates a strong presumption that a convicted prisoner will not be
executed while insane. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:24 (1970) ("The governor, with the
advice of the council, may respite ... the execution of a sentence of death upon a con-
vict ... if it appears to their satisfaction that the convict has become insane.")
Only Texas and Vermont are apparently without any current statutory provisions or
case law addressing the execution of insane prisoners.
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the procedures employed to implement this rule vary considerably,5
most states relegate the initial evaluation of a prisoner's insanity claim
to the exclusive discretion of a prison administrator." After a deter-
mination that the prisoner has raised a credible insanity claim, the
administrator usually reports to a state executive official or state
court judge, who initiates a proceeding to examine the prisoner's
sanity.7 If found to be sane, the prisoner is returned to the state
prison for execution; if found to be insane, the prisoner is sent to a
state mental hospital until he regains his sanity and can be returned
to prison for execution."
Although this procedure has been upheld as constitutionally suffi-
cient by the United States Supreme Court, only three opinions have
been written on the issue in the last eighty-two years,9 and the latest
was written in 1958. The Supreme Court has subsequently prescribed
more stringent constitutional guidelines governing both state proce-
dures involving capital punishment and procedures threatening the
deprivation of due process of law.' 0 This Note argues that the pre-
viously approved state procedures for assessing the sanity of prisoners
sentenced to death are inadequate when analyzed in light of these
more recent decisions, and that more extensive procedural protections
are constitutionally required to protect both the convicted prisoner's
right not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment and his right to
due process. In addition, the Note proposes a framework of procedural
safeguards designed to protect the rights of condemned prisoners to
raise the issue of insanity and to have that claim properly evaluated.
5. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1964) (providing that warden shall transfer
prisoner to state hospital for sanity determination to be conducted in whatever manner
hospital deems appropriate) and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:24 (1970) (empowering governer
with advice of council to postpone execution if it appears to their satisfaction that convict
has become insane) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1005 (West 1958) (requiring court to
impanel jury if there is good reason to suspect insanity).
6. See p. 538 infra.
7. See pp. 539-40 infra.
8. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 468-70 (1954). This Note
does not directly address the constitutional implications of the procedures used in return-
ing prisoners to prison upon the restoration of sanity, although much of the same reason-
ing concerning the condemned prisoner's initial sanity claim is most probably applicable.
Cf. pp. 544-48 infra (advocating minimum procedural due process requirements of notice,
hearing, and proper balancing); pp. 550-52 infra (applying requisite procedural stan-
dards in capital cases to condemned prisoner's insanity claim).
9. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), discussed at pp. 542-43 infra; Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), discussed at p. 542 infra; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398
(1897), discussed at p. 541 infra.
10. See pp. 544-50 infra.
534
Vol. 88: 533, 1979
Insanity of the Condemned
I. Development and Extent of Contemporary Procedures
The substantive policy against executing the insane has its origin
deep in the common law. Analysis of the rationale underlying this
policy and of the procedures that have traditionally implemented
it illuminates the need for constitutional safeguards.
A. The Common Law and Constitutional Justification
The common law provided that no insane person could be exe-
cuted.1 Although the rationale for the rule is obscure, a number of
explanations have been advanced.12 It has been suggested, for ex-
ample, that an insane prisoner may be unable to reflect intelligently
on his crime, his trial, and the proceedings employed after trial. With-
out such reflection, the prisoner is deprived of the opportunity to
devise reasons for a stay of execution." Similarly, executing a pris-
oner who is unable to reflect on his conduct and predicament has
been viewed as depriving him of his last opportunity to make his
peace with God.'
4
It has also been suggested that executing an insane prisoner is for-
bidden because such executions would insignificantly serve the so-
cietal interests in deterrence and retribution. As one commentator
has suggested, the spectacle of an insane man's execution is perhaps
too "miserable" a sight to serve any public educational purpose,15
11. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0395-96; E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 4
(London 1809) (Ist ed. London 1644); 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 34-35 (IV. Stokes & E. Ingersoll ed. 1847) (Ist ed. London 1716); 1 W. HAWKINS,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (6th ed. London 1787) (Ist ed. London 1716); Hawles, Remarks on
the Tryal of Charles Bateman, in 3 STATE-TRYALS 651, 652-53 (London 1719). Relevant
quotations from these sources are collected in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 17-19
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12. See Hazard & Louisell, Death, The State, and The Insane: Stay of Execution, 9
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 381, 381-89 (1962) (thorough analysis of purposes underlying common
law rule). The authors contend that "[t]he very multiplicity of explanations (for the
common law rule] suggest that the rule may have been devised to meet an earlier
theoretical or practical need or social consensus and has survived the obsolescence of the
originating cause." Id. at 383 (footnote omitted).
13. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *395-96; I J. CHiTTY, THE CRIMINAL LAw 761
(Philadelphia 1819); 1 M. HALE, supra note 11, at 34-35. But see Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d
144, 158-:-9, 208 P.2d 668, 676, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949), overruled, Caritativo v.
Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 307, 303 P.2d 339, 341 (1956), aff'd sub nor. Caritativo v. California,
357 U.S. 549 (1958) (Traynor, J., concurring) (contending that justification is unconvincing
because sane prisoners may be equally denied opportunity to devise reasons for stay of
execution; only remote possibility that new reasons would come to mind); Hazard &
Louisell, supra note 12, at 383-84 (same).
14. Hawles, supra note 11, at 653.
15. E. COKE, supra note 11, at 6. Contra, Hawles, supra note II, at 652 (arguing that
execution of madman will strike terror into others, "for the Terror to the living is
equal, whether the Person be mad or in his Senses").
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and deferring the execution will not significantly diminish the gen-
eral deterrent effect of capital punishment.16 Moreover, some believe
that executing an insane prisoner would not satisfy society's need for
catharsis and revenge,' 7 because a retributive society is unable to
exact a life of equal value to the one taken.'
There also may be constitutional justifications for excusing the
insane from execution, although the Supreme Court has never di-
rectly addressed this issue.' 9 Justice Frankfurter, for example, argued
that the states' uniform adoption of the common law rule grants the
insane a Fourteenth Amendment due process right not to be ex-
ecuted.20 In addition, execution of the insane may violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments as a cruel and unusual punishment.
21
16. The theory suggests that the potential offender is not deterred by the execution
of an insane prisoner because he cannot empathize with the plight of the insane convict.
See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 12, at 384-86.
17. Retribution serves in part as a release for the law-abiding citizenry because it
counteracts a subconscious temptation to break the law. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of
the Insanity Plea-Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the
Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425, 435 (1964). For this release to be effective, however, society
must be able to identify with the prisoner, and such identification is impossible if the
prisoner is insane. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 12, at 387.
In addition, retribution "is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly
offensive conduct." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (foot.
note omitted). Yet, by executing an insane prisoner, society may be punishing a person
who, for all moral purposes, is not the same person who committed the crime. See
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (questioning both
whether insane prisoner is still himself and whether he is same man who was convicted
for crime). But see White, A Prison Psychosis in the Making, 4 J. Am. INST. CRim. L. &
CRIMINoLOGY 237, 244 (1913) (psychosis causing prisoner's present insanity may in fact be
same mental state or stressful reaction that occurred when person committed crime).
18. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. Ruv. 454, 458-59 (1967) ("[r]he
societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state
is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its significance.") (footnote
omitted). But see Ehrenzweig, supra note 17, at 437-38 (society's primitive desire for
revenge is not deprived by execution of insane prisoners because society simply desires
extermination of criminal, whether sane or not); Hazard & Louisell, supra note 12, at 386
(same).
19. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11 (1950) (limiting review to question of
whether Georgia procedure employed to determine sanity of convicted prisoner offends
due process); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897) (issue for review is not whether
insane person can be executed, but rather what procedures should be used to determine
whether convict is insane).
20. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16-21 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But cf.
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (not conclusive that adoption of procedure by
large number of states determines due process).
21. See Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards For The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1027-30 (1978) (applying "risk of
error" theory of review to resolve uncertainty about whether specific punishment is cruel
and unusual). Application of this theory to executions of insane convicts demonstrates
that strong factors of irrevocability, enormity, and fundamental individual interests tip
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Under the standard outlined by Justice Marshall in his concurrence
in Furman v. Georgia,22 execution of an insane prisoner would con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment because the insane were not
executed at the time the Constitution was adopted,23 because the
punishment is unusual,2 4 excessive, and serves no valid legislative
purpose,2 and because popular sentiment is strongly opposed to such
use of the punishment.26
B. Existing Procedures for Determining the
Sanity of the Condemned
Although almost every state, by case law or statute, has adopted
the common law rule that a convicted prisoner cannot be executed
while insane,2 7 the common law provides scant guidance for resolving
the three basic issues involved in evaluating the condemned pris-
oner's sanity: (1) how the insanity claim is raised, (2) under what
procedures the claim's validity is determined, and (3) according to
what standard of insanity the claim is evaluated. In attempting to
resolve these questions, the states have constructed different systems
for determining whether or not the condemned prisoner is insane.
the balance toward postponing execution; moreover, the states' interests in deterrence,
retribution, and preservation of precedent are relatively insignificant justifications for
executing the insane. Id. at 1029.
22. 408 U.S. 238, 329-33 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
23. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf. McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (cruel and unusual punish-
ments do not include those penalties in common use at time Eighth Amendment was
adopted).
24. Although Justice Marshall indicated that the word "unusual" in the Eighth
Amendment has little historical meaning, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring), he suggested that an innovative punishment would be uncon-
stitutionally unusual if it wee more cruel than the punishment that it superseded. Id.
at 331. Because insane prisoners were not previously executed at common law, the
application of capital punishment to them, therefore, would constitute an unusual
punishment.
25. When the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the death penalty is a cruel
and unusual punishment per se, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), discussed at
pp. 548-50 infra, the plurality assumed that the penalty was supported by sufficient
penological justification, id. at 183. The Court indicated, however, that the two primary
social purposes supporting the death penalty are retribution and deterrence. Id. If
neither deterrence nor retribution is effectively served by execution of the insane, see
pp. 535-36 supra, then application of the death penalty to an insane person is, in fact,
cruel and unusual. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285-86, 300-05 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (punishment is cruel and unusual if it cannot be shown to serve any penal
purpose more effectively than significantly less drastic punishment).
26. Although it is unclear whether case law adoption of the common law rule against
executing the insane indicates popular sentiment, widespread statutory adoption sug-
gests that popular sentiment continues to reject the use of the death penalty against in-
sane prisoners. See notes 1 8- 3 supra.
27. See notes 1-4 supira.
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1. Raising the Issue of Insanity
The English common law allowed the issue of a condemned pris-
oner's insanity to be raised in the form of a simple motion to the
court having jurisdiction over the prisoner.28 Some states have adopted
this common law procedure without alteration.2 9 Other states re-
quire that a claim of insanity be made to the state governor. 30 Twenty
states, however, allow the issue of insanity to be raised only by the
warden or sheriff having custody of the prisoner.31 In many of these
states the prisoner's sanity will be examined only after a reasonable
doubt has arisen in his custodian's mind.32 The manner in which
such doubt can be implanted in the sheriff's or warden's mind, how-
ever, is uniformly left unstated. Consequently, it is unclear whether
a warden or sheriff in these states can be compelled to inquire into
a prisoner's sanity.33
28. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897); H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 8, at 465.
29. In four states (Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington) this procedure
has been adopted through case law. See note 2 supra (citing cases). Seven other states
(Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island) have
adopted this common law procedure by statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1975);
IDAHO CODE § 73-116 (1973).
30. Georgia, for example, provides that "[u]pon satisfactory evidence being offered to
the Governor, showing reasonable grounds to believe that a person convicted of a capital
offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor may, in his discre-
tion, have said person examined." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1978). Five other states
(Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York) grant similar power
to their chief executive. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 922.06-.07 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:24 (1970).
31. There are 17 states (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming) that permit sanity determinations only if the convict awaiting
execution appears to the warden or the sheriff to be insane. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-101 (1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.425 (1977). South Carolina has a similar restriction,
but it also permits others to raise the issue of insanity. S.C. CODE § 44-23-210 (1976 &
Supp. 1977) (issue can be raised either by superintendent of state mental health facility or
warden). Two other states (Kentucky and Virginia) imply that the warden must raise the
issue of insanity, because the warden is solely responsible for initiating the sanity hear-
ing. Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.240 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 19.2-177 (1975).
32. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1964) (superintendent of penitentiary must be
satisfied there are "reasonable grounds" for believing condemned prisoner is insane); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (warden must have "reasonable cause" to be-
lieve insanity).
33. See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 12, at 390 (in most states it is "unsettled
whether mandamus will lie against a warden who is alleged to have wrongfully refused
to initiate the inquiry"). Compare Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (warden has mandatory duty continually to check on condemned
persons' mental condition) with id. at 555 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (no remedy avail-
able if warden fails to perform his duties properly).
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2. Analyzing the Insanity Claim
Once doubt as to the condemned prisoner's sanity has arisen, the
states provide several different procedures for evaluating the merits
of the insanity claim. A number of states have adopted the common
law rule that permits the reviewing court to select the appropriate
procedure in its discretion.3 4 Other states either regulate the pro-
cedure by statute3 5 or delegate the decision to the discretion of a
state official such as the governor,3 0 the warden,3 7 or the state hos-
pital director.38
No state confers an absolute right on a prisoner to have a trial on
the issue of his present sanity, although some states do require a trial
after a plausible claim to insanity has been raised.3 9 Many states do
not provide for a trial at all, but rather provide that physicians or
psychiatrists be appointed to examine any prisoner presenting a rea-
sonable insanity claim. 40 If the medical experts agree that the prisoner
34. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950) (restating common law rule); Nobles
v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897) (same); H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 8, at 465 (same).
But see 4 IV. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *25 (jury trial on questions of insanity is
necessary).
Four states (Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington) have adopted the
common law rule in their case law. See note 2 supra (citing cases). Four additional states
(Alabama, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio) have a statutory rule similar to the Rhode
Island provision that "the presiding justice of the superior court, or in his absence any
justice of the superior court, may order such examination of said person as in his discre-
tion he shall deem proper." R.I. GEN. L_,ws § 26-4-9 (1968); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:165-11 (West 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-4 (1964).
35. Sixteen states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming) prescribe the procedure by statute. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700.5-
3703 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-18-901 to -903 (1977). Three additional
states (Connecticut, Delaware, and Kansas) also retain statutory regulations, although
these states provide that use of these procedures is within the discretion of the court
reviewing the claim. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406
(1974); KAN. STAT. § 22-4006 (Supp. 1977).
36. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-2708 (1948 9- Supp. 1973);
MID. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 (1976); N.Y. CoRRac. LAw § 655 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
37. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.240 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 44-23-210 (1976).
38. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1964); COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-23-101 (1973 & Supp.
1976).
39. Six states (Arizona, California, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) require
a trial after a reasonable claim has been raised. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701 (West
1970); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-901 (1977).
40. Delaware, for example, provides that "the Court may appoint 2 reputable prac-
ticing physicians to inquire of the mental condition of the prisoner." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 406 (1974). Similar provisions are included in 15 other state statutory schemes
(Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). See,
e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 (1976); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 48 (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1968).
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is insane, he will be committed, often without a trial or a hearing,4 1
to a mental health facility.
If a trial or hearing is initiated, the mode of inquiry varies among
the states. If a trial is granted, it may be by jury42 or by the court;"3
if a less formal hearing is prescribed, it may include many of the
procedural safeguards of a trial44 or it may be a simple ex parte
proceeding.
45
3. The Standard of Insanity
At common law, the test of insanity was whether the condemned
man was aware of his conviction and the nature of his impending
fate.46 Most states, however, have not adopted this test and have omit-
ted any reference to the standard of insanity that is to be used. It is
possible that the state's legal definition of insanity as used in other
stages of the criminal justice system is regarded as sufficient.47 There
41. Thirteen states (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Virginia) do
not require a trial or hearing on the medical examiners' reports. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 406 (1974) ("[s]hould the report of the physicians be that the prisoner is mentally
ill, he shall at once be ordered ... to the Delaware State Hospital"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-
2537 (1975) ("[i]f two of the commission shall find the convict insane, the judge shall
suspend his execution").
42. Four states (Arizona, California, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) require a jury trial
after plausible evidence of insanity has been presented. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701
(West 1970); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-901 (1977). Three other states provide that a jury trial may
be held at the court's discretion (Alabama, Ohio) or with the concurrence of the court
and the county sheriff (Utah). ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1975); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.28
(Page 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-9 (1953).
43. There are seven states (Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and North Carolina) that provide a trial by the court. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2304, 506 (1969 & Supp.
1977).
44. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2304, 506 (1969 & Supp. 1977) (providing each
party to sanity hearing rights to summon and cross-examine examining psychiatrists and
to offer evidence); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.435 (1977) (same).
45. An ex parte hearing is conducted upon application of the state representative,
without notice to the prisoner. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1978)
(warden required to notify only court, prosecuting attorney, state mental diseases director,
and attorney general, each of whom may examine prisoner); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-14.4
to -5 (1964) (requiring attendance of only district attorney who may produce witnesses).
The ex parte hearing, therefore, lacks many essential elements of an adversary trial,
including notice, an opportunity to present evidence, an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to counsel.
46. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 12, at 394 & n.44. Another way of stating this stan-
dard of insanity is whether the convicted prisoner is "'aware of the proceedings against
him."' Id.
47. The Montana statutory scheme, for example, states that "the mental fitness of the
defendant (under sentence of death] will be determined in accordance with the provisions
of chapter 5, Competency of the Accused." MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 95-2304 (1969 &
Supp. 1977). But see note 168 inf!ra (reviewing other insanity and competency tests, and
demonstrating failure of these tests to relate to circumstances of condemned prisoner's
insanity).
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are a few states, however, that have attempted to set a specific standard
of insanity for this stage of the criminal justice process.48 One such
test is whether the prisoner can intelligently understand his crime,
the nature of the proceedings against him, the purposes and extent
of his punishment, and any fact that might make his punishment
unjust or unlawful. The test also requires that the prisoner possess
the intelligence to convey such information to his attorney or to
the court.
4 9
II. The Supreme Court's Analysis of State Practices
A. The Cases
The United States Supreme Court has considered three constitu-
tional challenges to the procedures employed in deferring the exe-
cution of insane prisoners. In each of these cases the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the suspect state procedure. The petitioner in
Nobles v. Georgia,50 who had been sentenced to death, was the first
allegedly insane person to claim a right to a jury trial on the issue
of her sanity. At that time, the Georgia procedure required the
sheriff, at his discretion, to initiate an inquiry by a jury and report
the results to the sentencing court.51 In upholding the procedure,
the Supreme Court explained that because the common law had
provided no right to a jury trial on the issue, the Georgia legis-
lature was free to adopt whatever procedures it desired.52
48. Only four states (New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania) include in
their case law standards of insanity uniquely applicable to these proceedings. See In re
Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 59, 176 P. 819, 823 (1918); In re Keaton, 19 Ohio App. 2d 254, 262-63,
250 N.E.2d 901, 906 (1969), vacated in part on other grounds. 408 U.S. 936 (1972); Bingham
v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 305, 310-11, 169 P.2d 311, 314-15 (1946); Commonwealth v. Moon,
383 Pa. 18, 23-24, 117 A.2d 96, 99-100 (1955).
Four other states (Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and New Jersey) have included a test for
insanity for this purpose in their statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1974) (whether
convicted prisoner "understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why
it is to be imposed upon him"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (prisoner
shall not be executed "if as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks capacity to
understand the nature and purpose of the punishment about to be imposed upon him
or matters in extenuation, arguments for executive clemency or reasons why the sentence
should not be carried out").
49. In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48, 59, 176 P. 819, 823 (1918), quoted in Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9, 20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This standard has been cited with ap-
proval in at least two states. In re Keaton, 19 Ohio App. 2d 254, 262-63, 250 N.E.2d 901,
906 (1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936 (1972); Bingham v. State, 82
Okla. Crim. 305, 310-11, 169 P.2d 311, 314-15 (1946).
50. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
51. Id. at 402-03. The procedures to be used at this inquiry were not delineated in
the statute, but the Court implied that the procedures would entail less procedural safe-
guards than a criminal jury trial. Id. at 405.
52. Id. at 409.
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Fifty-three years later, in Solesbee v. Balkcom53 the Supreme Court
again evaluated the procedures used to review a condemned prisoner's
insanity claim. The case involved a revised Georgia statute that pro-
vided that the governor, if presented with satisfactory evidence that
a person awaiting execution had become insane, could, in his dis-
cretion, select physicians to examine the prisoner.54 The Supreme
Court rejected an attack on the procedure and affirmed the state court's
assertion that the exemption from execution conferred on insane
prisoners was a matter of grace, not of right.55 The Court analogized
the postponement of execution to the state executive's unreviewable
power to grant reprieve or pardon.56
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Solesbee, argued that the right
of a prisoner not to be executed while insane is protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary pro-
cedures that may jeopardize that right.57 He concluded that a con-
demned prisoner claiming insanity should be afforded at least the
right to a hearing. 8
The last of the three cases, Caritativo v. California,9 involved Cali-
fornia's statutory provision vesting the warden with sole responsibility
for initiating a judicial inquiry into a prisoner's sanity.30 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had ruled that under state law the courts
lacked jurisdiction to consider the sanity of a condemned prisoner
53. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
54. Id. at 10 n.l.
55. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 122, 126, 52 S.E.2d 433, 436
(1949)).
56. Id. at 11-12. In deciding not to extend the procedural safeguards available at trial
to the postconviction sanity determination, the Court relied on its then recent holding
in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), cited in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12
(1950). In Williams, the Court held that it was not a denial of due process for a sen-
tencing judge to use information supplied by witnesses that the accused could not con-
front or cross-examine, even though the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury
recommendation of mercy. 337 U.S. at 252. Williams has recently been distinguished,
however, by the Supreme Court in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality
opinion of Stevens, J.). In that case, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Stewart and
Powell, asserted that Gardner was denied due process of law when his death sentence was
imposed on the basis of information that he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Id.
at 362. The opinion substantially undercut the reasoning in both Williams and Solesbee
by stating that constitutional developments in the areas of capital punishment and due
process require greater procedural protections for individuals convicted of capital crimes
than for those found guilty of lesser crimes. Id. at 355-62.
57. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 23-26.
59. 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (per curiam).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700-3701 (Deering 1941), quoted at 357 U.S. at 553-54 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700-3704.5 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1978)).
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unless the warden initiated an inquiry into the prisoner's sanity.61
In a one sentence, per curiam opinion that cited Solesbee, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the California court's deci-
sion.62 Three justices, however, dissented from the Caritativo decision
and one justice wrote a separate, concurring opinion. Justice Harlan's
concurrence argued that the California statute imposed upon the
warden mandatory duties both to check the prisoner's mental con-
dition continually, and to make a respofisible, good faith determina-
tion whether a judicial inquiry into sanity was necessary. 63 Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented.64 Not-
ing that the warden's decision is both final and ex parte,6 5 he argued
that the Constitution demands that the prisoner be granted a better
opportunity to present his claim of insanity, although not necessarily
in a formal adversary hearing or in a judicial proceeding. 66
B. Constitutional Shortcomings of Present Procedures
The Supreme Court has not considered the constitutional validity
of procedures governing the insanity claims of condemned prisoners
since 1958. A de facto moratorium on executions6 T has concealed the
issue during much of this time. The Court's recent validation of the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,8 however, increases the likelihood
61. Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), aff'd sub norn. Caritativo
v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958). The California court refused to issue a writ of mandate
to compel the warden to institute sanity proceedings. The court reasoned that the method
of determining insanity was controlled by the state legislature, and that the method then
in force did not permit the courts to suspend execution in order to investigate a prisoner's
sanity independently. A judicial proceeding was allowed under California procedure only
after the warden had determined that one was necessary. Id. at 306-07, 303 P.2d at 341;
accord, People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 514-16, 235 P.2d 381, 384-85 (1951); In re Phyle,
30 Cal. 2d 838, 847, 186 P.2d 134, 139-40 (1947), cert. dismissed, 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
62. 357 U.S. at 550.
63. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan conceded that the prisoner was
not guaranteed an opportunity to present his case to the warden, but claimed that once
a judicial proceeding was initiated, the prisoner should have the opportunity to present
his case. Id.
64. Id. at 552 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 556 (no obligation to afford "the condemned man, his counsel, or family,
any opportunity whatsoever to present evidence or arguments highly relevant to the
proper disposition of the case').
66. Id. at 556-59.
67. There were no executions in the United States from June 1967, until January 17,
1977, when Gary Gilmore was executed in Utah. See H. BEDAU, THE COURTs, THE CON-
STITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT xiii, 62, 121 (1977).
68. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens joined in the plurality opinion. Four other justices concurred in the judgment.
See id. at 207 (0hite, J.); id. at 226 (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 227 (Black-
mun, J.). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. See id. (Brennan, J.); id. at 231
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that capital punishment will be renewed and that the insanity claims
of condemned prisoners will again become an important issue. The
long-dormant state procedures for dealing with these insanity claims,
therefore, will also become significant.
Two recent series of Supreme Court cases, decided in the last
decade, engender substantial doubt about the continued viability of
these previously sustained procedures. The first series of cases con-
cerns the basic procedural protections required in cases involving
the threatened deprivation of "private" 6 interests. The second series
of cases addresses the procedures required in capital cases in order
to prevent the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. An
analysis of developments in both these areas of constitutional law
demonstrates the inadequacies of the procedural protection presently
being afforded condemned prisoners with claims to insanity.
1. The Supreme Court Due Process Decisions
Recent Supreme Court decisions recognize that the requirements
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
satisfied whenever the government places in jeopardy a substantial
private interest in life,70 liberty,71 or property.72 This due process
protection is extended regardless of how the interest is created 3 or
(Marshall, J.). Although only three justices joined the Gregg plurality, it has been treated
as controlling law in subsequent cases, see Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963 (1978)
(plurality opinion), and will be treated as such in this Note.
69. "Private" interests, as used in this Note, refer to the legal rights or interests of
the affected individual or organization, as contrasted with "public" or governmental
concerns. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
70. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978) (plurality opinion) (death
penalty procedure in Ohio held not to permit full consideration of defendant's character
and record as required by Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause,
and Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1977) (plurality opinion) (denial of due process when death sentence was imposed, at
least in part, on basis of information that petitioner had no opportunity to deny or
explain).
71. Liberty interests have been construed broadly. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974) (prison disciplinary scheme forfeiting prisoner good-time credits
infringes liberty interest protected by due process clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (liberty right to conceive and to raise one's children protected by due
process clause, and entitles father to hearing on his fitness as parent before deprived of
custody of children).
72. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (state replevin statutes invalid
because they deprive persons of property without due process right to prior hearing);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (state garnishment procedure
deprives persons of property without due process rights to notice and prior hearing).
73. It has been contended that statutes granting private interests determine not only
the nature of the interest, but also the extent to which it is protected. See Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-55 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.); cf. Nobles v. Georgia,
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labeled. 74 The procedural protection can be limited only if the pri-
vate interest is nonexistent 75 or de minimus.7
6
These developments undermine the reasoning of earlier decisions
holding that an insane prisoner's interest in not being executed is
a privilege granted by the state rather than a right not to be ex-
ecuted.77 Similarly, the view that the insane prisoner has no assurance
of any procedural protections because there was no right to any
specific procedures at common law78 is no longer valid. The Supreme
168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) ("the manner in which such question [of a condemned prisoner's
insanity] should be determined was purely a matter of legislative regulation"). This
reasoning, however, has been rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court. See Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (1974) (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (once in-
terest is conferred, it is protected by constitutional principle of due process, not by
legislative fiat); id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) (same); id. at 211
(Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (same); cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 230-35 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (prisoner's liberty interest is created and pro-
tected by Constitution, not by state prison regulations).
74. Prior to the recent series of decisions, see notes 70-72 supra (citing cases), the Court
frequently declined to extend procedural due process protection to interests that it
deemed to be privileges conferred by government largesse, such as government employ-
ment or state licenses. Due process protection was limited to explicitly defined constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (privilege to
practice medicine); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (no right to government employment); Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L.
REv. 1439, 1439-42 (1968). The Supreme Court, however, no longer employs a mechanical,
right-privilege analysis to govern the applicability of the due process clause. See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 9: n.9 (1972) (citing cases). A government
benefit will be protected in some manner under the due process clause so long as it in-
volves an important private interest.
75. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-29 (1976) (transfer of state prisoner
to inferior prison held not to infringe liberty because prisoner already forfeited liberty
upon conviction and confinement); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-50 (1976) (dis-
charge of police officer did not deprive him of property or liberty interest protected by
due process clause because he had no guarantee or claim of entitlement to job and was
not limited in seeking other employment).
76. Although the gravity of an interest does not determine whether it is protected
but only the extent to which it is protected, an interest will not be protected if it is
deemed de minimus. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (as long as liberty
interest is not de minimus, it is protected by some due process); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 576 (1975) (as long as property deprivation is not de minimus, its gravity is irrelevant).
77. See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11 (1950), discussed at p. 542 supra;
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1897), discussed at p. 541 supra; Phyle v. Duffy,
34 Cal. 2d 144, 156-57, 208 P.2d 668, 675, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949), overruled,
Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 307, 303 P.2d 339, 341 (1956), af'd sub norn. Caritativo
v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (Traynor, J., concurring).
78. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1950); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398,
409 (1897). It has been suggested that the common law controls the extent of the pro-
cedural protection afforded to private interests. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-76
(1977) (dictum) (contending that common law dictates extent of protection afforded
child's liberty interest in corporal punishment cases). This suggestion, however, was not
even persuasive to the Court that made it, because Ingraham applied a traditional
balancing analysis, see pp. 546-47 infra, to determine the procedural protection necessary.
430 U.S. at 675.
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Court has consistently recognized the need for procedural mechanisms
to safeguard even newly created statutory entitlements39 The uni-
form adoption of the common law rule against executing insane
prisoners has, in effect, vested that prisoner with a substantial in-
terest-an entitlement to life while insaneS°0-that deserves the pro-
tection of the due process clause.
Determination of the existence of an interest deserving procedural
protection constitutes only the first step in contemporary due process
analysis. Once such an interest is identified, the extent of pro-
cedural protection must be established. To this end, the Court has
employed a balancing process that weighs three distinct factors: the
private interest that will be affected by government action, the
public interest in limiting the fiscal and administrative burdens of
additional procedural safeguards, and the probable effect such safe-
79. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1," 9-12 (1978)
(legitimate claim of entitlement to municipal utility services protected as property by
due process clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (legitimate and
protected claim to statutory welfare benefits).
80. Although the precise nature of the condemned prisoner's interest may be uncer-
tain, its traditional characterization by the Supreme Court as a "privilege," see p. 545
supra, is no longer viable because the right-privilege distinction has been abandoned, see
note 74 supra. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter obliquely referred to the prisoner's in-
terest as a Fourteenth Amendment right or a due process right. See Caritativo v. Cali-
fornia, 357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 557 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to accept this vague label, preferring in-
stead to characterize the affected interest as life, liberty, or property before determining
the extent of due process protection. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343 (1976);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
A condemned prisoner's insanity claim would seem not to entail a liberty interest. First,
the prisoner does not lose any additional liberty by being transferred from death row to
a mental hospital. Second, the prisoner can be viewed as having forfeited any liberty
interest by his conviction and confinement. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-29
(1976). The prisoner's interest is not precisely a property interest either, if a property
right must be a tangible or fungible possession. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERT', Introduc-
tory Note, at 3 (1936).
The condemned prisoner's interest, therefore, must be some subdivision of his interest
in life. Much of his "life interest," of course, has been sacrificed by his conviction and
sentence to death. Yet, a condemned prisoner retains enough of his interest in life to be
granted some due process protection in postsentencing procedures. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring specific kind of appellate review in
capital cases to protect interests of condemned prisoner).
In the situation of an allegedly insane condemned prisoner, this residual "life interest"
is supplemented by a common law and statutory right-the right not to be executed
while insane. The state has, in effect, returned to the prisoner some of his forfeited
interest in life, albeit only so long as he remains insane. Nonetheless, the supplemental
right-this entitlement to remain alive while insane-is hardly de minimus, inasmuch as
it affords the prisoner both the opportunity to make his peace with God and the further
chance to challenge his conviction and sentence. See p. 535 supra. Once a state confers
this entitlement on the prisoner, for whatever reason, the state cannot then deprive him
of the entitlement without affording some due process protection. See pp. 544-45 supra.
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guards will have on reducing the risk of erroneous decisions.81 If,
for example, the private interest is considerable,8 2 the risk of error
great,83 or the governmental interest attenuated,8 4 due process pro-
tections will generally be more extensive. On the other hand, if
the private interest in a particular procedure is weak,85 the risk of
error small,80 and the governmental interest substantial,87 more ex-
pedited procedural systems are permitted. The only indispensable
procedural protections are notice and a hearing,s8 but the form and
timing of even these procedures are determined through the balancing
process.89
81. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). For applications of the
Mathews balancing criteria, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1978) (procedure prior to termination of municipal utilities); Dixon v. Love, 431
U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977) (procedure prior to revocation of driver's license).
82. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-91 (1973) (strong presumption of
right to counsel in probation revocation hearing when probationer is incapable of speak-
ing for himself); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (pretermination hearing
required for welfare recipients, because deprivation of benefits may deprive them of
essentials of life).
83. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1975) (risk of error in school dis-
ciplinary process "not at all trivial," and should be guarded against with notice and hear-
ing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972) (great danger under replevin statutes thdt
applicant's confidence in his case will be misplaced).
84. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (state's interest in caring
for children is de minimus if father is shown to be fit parent); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 540-41 (1971) (government's interest in reducing expense by not providing expanded
hearing when suspending drivers' licenses minimal).
85. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977) (private interest implicated when
individual deprived of driver's license "not so great" as to require prior hearing); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974) (deprivation of good-time credits for prisoners less
significant than revocation of parole; full range of procedural protections at hearing not
required).
86. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-47 (1976) (risk of error in ad-
ministrative denial of disability benefits small because decision depended on reliable
medical examinations); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1974) (state
sequestration procedure valid even without prior notice and hearing, since judicial con-
trol of process minimizes risk of creditor's wrongful possession).
87. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-62, 567-72 (1974) (important state
interests involved in prison disciplinary proceedings weigh heavily against providing for
confrontation, cross-examination, and appointed counsel); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (significant government interest in internal
operation of military establishment permits exclusion of cook from base without hearing).
88. 1uentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (central meaning of procedural due
process includes right to notice and right to be heard); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), quoted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) ("there can
be no doubt that at a minimum [the words of the due process clause] . . . require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and op-
portunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"); see Board of Regents V.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972) ("constitutional requirements of opportunity for sonme
form of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course, does not depend
upon such a narrow balancing process") (emphasis in original).
89. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (timing and content of notice and
nature of hearing depend on appropriate accommodation of competing interests in-
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In order to satisfy these due process requirements, the states must
devise procedural schemes that adequately protect the interest of the
insane prisoner in avoiding execution. State statutes can no longer
indiscriminately prescribe the procedural system to be employed,90
but must reflect instead a balancing of the interests involved. These
interests include the individual prisoner's entitlement to defer ex-
ecution while insane, society's interest in avoiding the erroneous
execution of insane criminals, and the governmental interests in re-
ducing the expensive burden of formal judicial proceedings and in
avoiding delaying tactics by prisoners.91
2. The Supreme Court Death Penalty Decisions
92
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued a brief, per curiam
opinion in Furman v. Georgia93 that reversed the death sentences
imposed in three capital cases. 94 That opinion held that imposition
of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and -unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.u
Four years later, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the status
of the death penalty in five separate, plurality opinions.90 These
opinions rejected the contention that the death penalty is cruel and
volved); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972) (relative weight of liberty or
property interests relevant to form of notice and hearing). Compare Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976) (not requiring pretermination hearing in disability benefit
cases) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring pretermination hearing in
welfare benefit cases).
90. See pp. 539-40 suPra.
91. See pp. 562-63 infra.
92. A brief historical review of the Supreme Court's treatment of the death penalty
issue over the last seven years is contained in the plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio,
98 S. Ct. 2954, 2961-63 (1978).
93. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
94. For the final decisions of the state courts in these cases, see Jackson v. State, 225
Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969) (capital rape); Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628
(1969) (capital murder); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (capital
rape).
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). The meaning of the per curiam
opinion is illuminated by reference to the decisive concurring opinions of Justices
Stewart and White. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 & n.15 (1976) (plurality
opinion). Justice Stewart concluded that the sentences under review were impermissible
because "the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted). Justice White, on the other hand, concurred because "the
penalty [of death] is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated
to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
96. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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unusual punishment per se. 97 Instead, the plurality stated that al-
though death is qualitatively different from other punishments,9"
it constitutes an acceptable punishment for murder99 when admin-
istered under the aegis of a procedural system designed to eliminate
the arbitrariness that the Court deemed cruel and unusual in
Furman.100
In these opinions, the Court introduced a series of constitutional
guidelines to which a state procedural system is required to conform.
These guidelines require that:
a) State procedures must reflect society's contemporary standard re-
garding the infliction of death as a penalty for the crime committed
and for the particular criminal involved; 101.
b) The state procedural scheme must suitably direct and limit the
sentencing body's discretion by providing explicit criteria to direct
sentencing decisions;1
02
97. E.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (plurality opinion) (imposition of
death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment under every circumstance); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[wle now hold that the punish-
ment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution").
98. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion); accord, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion).
99. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-48 & n.4 (1976) (plurality opinion) (opinion
considering only constitutionality of death penalty for first-degree murder and not con-
stitutionality of death penalty for sexual battery of child under 12 years of age); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (issue in case is only whether
death penalty is acceptable punishment for murder). In the subsequent case of Coker v.
Geo*rgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the plurality held that the death sentence for rape is a
grossly disproportionate and excessive sentence and forbade it as cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 593-600.
100. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 189 ("Furman mandates
that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the de-
termination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.")
101. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976), analyzed three
indicators of societal opinion: state legislative action, statewide popular referenda, and
jury responses in actual cases. The plurality concluded that these three sources each
demonstrate a "marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for
murder." Id. at 179. Contra, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (contending that "capital punishment . .. is morally unacceptable to the
people of the United States at this time in their history"); id. at 295-300 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (death penalty has been almost totally rejected by contemporary society).
The plurality did find that contemporary society has rejected mandatory death sen-
tences, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 289-301 (1976), as well as death sentences for the crime of rape, Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-600 (1977).
102. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion) (re-
jecting mandatory death penalty scheme because it does not provide "objective standards
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c) State procedures must permit particularized consideration of rele-
vant aspects of the character and record of each defendant and of
the relevant circumstances of each crime.1
0 3
Application of these guidelines to the present procedures used in
deferring an insane prisoner's execution reveals that most of the
current state procedures are constitutionally insufficient in many re-
spects. In particular, state procedural schemes that permit arbitrary
or standardless decisions when insanity claims are raised, 04 that do
not enumerate explicit procedural standards to govern disposition of
insanity claims,' 05 and that do not provide a definition of insanity
to be used in these proceedings, 0 all fail to direct and limit the
discretion of official decisionmakers. Moreover, state procedural sys-
tems that permit insanity claims to be decided without a psychiatric
examination' 07 fail to provide the specialized, professional considera-
tion essential to a review of a condemned prisoner's insanity claim.
to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence
of death"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976), quoted in note 100 supra (plurality
opinion).
103. Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at
304 ("fundamental respect for humanity . . . requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.");
accord, Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963-67 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
Ohio's death penalty scheme because it restricts consideration of mitigating circumstances,
thus precluding individualized consideration of defendant's character and offense required
in capital cases).
104. Virtually every state screens the initial claim of insanity, either by limiting the
number of individuals who can raise the claim or by restricting hearings to reasonable
claims. See p. 538 sulpra. This screening process, even if conducted by responsible and
qualified personnel, permits wholly arbitrary decisions without any opportunity for
review. See, e.g., Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), afj'd sub nora.
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), discussed at pp. 542-43 supra; N.H. REv. ST.AT.
ANN. § 4:24 (1970) ("The governor, with the advice of the council, may respite . . . the
execution of a sentence of death ... if it appears to their satisfaction that the convict has
become insane.") In order to reduce the danger of arbitrariness, therefore, the con-
demned prisoner must be guaranteed at least one hearing on his insanity claim, see pp.
554-55 infra, as well as the opportunity for review of denials of requests for subsequent
hearings, see pp. 563-64 infra.
105. Sixteen states (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Washington) provide no statutory guidelines to assist the delibera-
tive body in weighing the insanity claims of a convicted prisoner. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2622 (1964) ("[t]he State Hospital officials shall cause an inquiry to be made
into the mental condition of the convict"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 26-4-9 (1968) ("justice of the
superior court, may order such examination of said person as in his discretion he shall
deem proper").
106. Only eight states provide a standard of insanity intended for the circumstances
of a condemned prisoner. See note 48 supra.
107. Although almost every state permits some form of inquiry into the convicted
prisoner's sanity once a plausible claim has been raised, there are 18 states (Alabama,
Arizona, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Wash-
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Although the plurality's reasoning would appear to mandate that
procedural safeguards govern the condemned prisoner's insanity claim,
language in Gregg v. Georgia suggests that the analysis applies only to
the initial sentencing decision. 08 The plurality stated that other deci-
sions-such as a prosecutor's decision whether to seek the penalty or a
governor's decision whether to grant a pardon-are not subject to the
imposition of procedural safeguards. 09 The plurality opinion articu-
lated two reasons for this limited position. First, the plurality viewed
certain decisions, such as the decision to postpone the execution of an
insane prisoner, as decisions "which may remove a defendant from con-
sideration as a candidate for the death penalty," not a decision to
impose the penalty. 110 Second, the plurality suggested that it may
be impossible to articulate realistic guidelines at other stages, be-
cause a decision to impose guidelines would result in the de facto
elimination of the death penalty, "by placing totally unrealistic con-
ditions on its use.""'
These concerns, however, should not render constitutional safe-
guards inapplicable to the condemned prisoner's insanity claim. The
decision to defer execution is only a temporary postponement of
execution, not a decision removing the prisoner from his ultimate
fate." 2 Moreover, both the decision not to accept a prisoner's insanity
claim and the determination that the prisoner is sane move a pris-
oner along the path to death as readily as do the decisions of a sen-
tencing judge or jury. 13 In addition, the assumption that standards
ington, and Wyoming) that do not explicitly guarantee that this inquiry will include a
pslchiatric examination. See notes 2-4 supra (citing cases and statutes). Some states require
a medical, but not necessarily a psychiatric, examination. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 202A.190 (1977 & Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 (1976). Other states do not
even require that examinations be conducted by physicians. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-57 (1972) (providing examination by "six physicians if such can be found, and if not,
other discreet and experienced freeholders and electors of said county"); N.Y. CORREC.
Lv~w § 655 (McKinney Supp. 1977) ("governor may appoint a commission of not more than
three disinterested persons to examine [prisoner]"). Some states simply provide for an
inquiry into sanity, with no mention whatsoever that the inquiry include medical or
psychiatric testimony. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-4 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
36-9 (1953 & Supp. 1977).
108. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 & n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion). The
plurality divided the initial sentencing decision into three separate elements: the statutory
definition of what constitutes a capital crime, the statutory criteria for selecting the class
of criminal defendants subject to capital penalties, and the judicial determination that a
particular defendant shall receive the death penalty. Id. at 196-98.
109. Id. at 199 & n.50.
110. Id. at 199.
Ill. Id. at 199 n.50.
112. Every state returns the condemned prisoner to prison for execution upon restora-
tion of sanity. See notes 2-4 supra (citing cases and statutes); cf. H. WEIHOFEN, sulPra note
8, at 468-70 (discussing prior state statutes concerning return to prison).
113. Black, Due Process for Dealh: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1976) (criticizing Court's justification for not extending its structural
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could not be formulated at this stage of the criminal process ignores
both the Supreme Court's successful assumption of the more onerous
task of standardizing the jury's sentencing deliberation" 4 and the
noteworthy guidelines already drafted by some states that assure due
process protection in similar situations.11 5
Perhaps the most compelling justification for extending procedural
protection to the insanity claim is the Court's decision in Furman."06
Furman held that the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment." 7 Yet, by deciding not to
investigate a condemned prisoner's insanity claim, the warden or
sheriff is effectively reimposing the penalty. Moreover, the judge or
jury that evaluates an insanity claim reimposes the penalty when
they reject that claim. Either decision to reject the insanity claim,
therefore, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments if made
arbitrarily or capriciously." 8 Only by extending the structural guide-
lines to these decisions can the Court ensure that the condemned pris-
oner is furnished with the procedural protections mandated by
Furman.
guidelines to other stages of criminal process); see C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 14-18, 69-74 (1974). Professor Black argues that the
death penalty is not the result of simply one choice by a judge or jury, but results from
a number of choices, including the prosecutor's decision whether to plea bargain and the
governor's decision whether to pardon or commute the sentence. Id.
114. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-95 (1976) (plurality opinion). The standards
for determining the insanity of the condemned may also, by necessity, be somewhat gen-
eral, but they provide guidance and reduce the likelihood of arbitrary or capricious
action. See pp. 553-64 infra.
115. Three states (Florida, Illinois, Indiana), in particular, furnish statutory pro-
cedures that reduce the risk of arbitrary or erroneous determinations of sanity. See FLA.
STAT. § 922.07 (1974); Act of July 26, 1972, Pub. Act No. 77-2097, § 5-2-3, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-2-3 (Smith-Hurd 1973); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-8-1 to -3 (Burns 1973 &
Supp. 1978). The Indiana statute is directed at cases in which the prisoner contests a
transfer to a mental institution; consequently, it fails to provide procedures that govern
the initial allegation of insanity. Nonetheless, the Indiana procedure is instructive. It
provides that when the warden believes the inmate is in need of care, there must be a
hearing if requested before transfer; notice of the time, place, and reason for the hear-
ing; a psychiatric examination; release of a copy of the psychiatrist's detailed report; an
opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to be represented by
counsel at the hearing; an impartial decision based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; and a written decision stating the evidence relied on. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-8-3
(Burns 1973).
116. 408 U.S. 238 (1972), discussed at p. 548 supra.
117. Id.
118. For an argument that discretionary decisions made at both the preconviction and
postsentencing stages "plainly he!p to determine who ultimately shall be executed," see
Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1690, 1712 (1974). The Note contends that arbitrariness becomes more likely at
these stages if discretion has been limited at other stages. Id. at 1715-16.
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III. Creating a New Procedural Framework for Determining
the Insanity of the Condemned
In light of the constitutional principles articulated in recent due
piocess and death penalty cases, it is apparent that Nobles, Solesbee,
and Caritativo are no longer controlling. At the very least, the due
process clause requires that a condemned prisoner be provided notice
of when and how his insanity claim will be reviewed and a hearing
in order to review that claim prior to execution. 119 Moreover, a
proper balancing of interests requires that, at a minimum, the pro-
cedural scheme provide for proper diagnosis of the prisoner's mental
condition,120 an adequate opportunity for review,' 2 ' and efficient but
fair control of repeated or feigned insanity claims. -2 2 These provisions
will also help guarantee that the condemned prisoner is protected by
the explicit standards and particularized consideration required in
capital cases. The failure of many state procedures to provide these
protections, 23 however, suggests that condemned prisoners are being
119. Cases in which prior notice and a hearing have not been provided at all have
involved exceptional circumstances. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)
("root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he
is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations")
(emphasis in original). Examples of these exceptional situations include Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975) (no presuspension hearing required for students whose pres-
ence in school poses continuing danger to persons or property); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974) (sequestration of property valid without notice and hearing
because defendant and creditor both had property interests at stake); Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (sensitive military
secrets on base required expulsion of all unapproved personnel). Even in these cases,
however, some type of preliminary administrative, or post-termination hearing was
provided. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (furnishing recipients of
disability benefits prior review and response to administrative action as well as post-
termination, evidentiary hearing); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)
(providing immediate full hearing following execution of sequestration writ). In the case
of condemned prisoners with insanity claims, however, the only conceivable solution is
prior notice and a hearing, because denial of the insanity claim results in execution.
120. Proper diagnosis involves both use of a proper definition of insanity, see pp. 561-
62 infra, and utilization of personnel qualified to evaluate an insanity claim, see p. 560
infra. Without such proper analysis, the individual's interest in not being executed while
insane is inadequately protected, and the risk of error is dramatically increased.
121. No procedural scheme can be absolutely error free. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 366 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that innocent men have been
convicted and executed). In the case of a convicted prisoner's insanity claim, however,
the entitlement to life granted by society is illusory unless error is reduced as much as
possible. A system of review helps reduce this error. See pp. 563-64 infra.
122. See pp. 562-63 infra.
123. No state presently guarantees a hearing upon the mere suggestion of insanity, see
note 41 supra (13 states do not require hearing even for claims supported by medical
evidence), and no state provides all the constitutionally sufficient procedures, see pp.
554-64 infra.
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deprived of due process and are suffering cruel and unusual punish-
ments.
To remedy these constitutional deficiencies, the Court should man-
date a procedural framework governing state statutory schemes that
incorporates these fundamental requirements of the due process and
death penalty cases. This Note proposes such a framework and ap-
plies it to current procedures affecting condemned prisoners' insanity
claims.
A. Raising the Issue of Insanity
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
condemned prisoner cannot be divested of his entitlement not to be
executed while insane until the state provides notice and a proper
hearing on his insanity claim. Unfortunately, in determining what
are valid insanity claims and hence whether a prisoner has a valid
entitlement, the screening processes erected by most states permit a
hearing on a condemned prisoner's insanity claim only at the dis-
cretion of a warden or governor. 24 These procedures, however, in-
vite the kinds of standardless, arbitrary decisions in capital cases that
the Supreme Court has deemed cruel and unusual punishment. 125
Moreover, by vesting the warden or governor with unreviewable dis-
cretion, these procedures allow insanity claims to be raised and re-
jected without any hearing or psychiatric investigation at all126 and,
thus, deprive the condemned prisoner of both minimal due process
protections and the particularized consideration of his relevant char-
acteristics required in capital cases.
A state, therefore, cannot screen initial insanity claims by limiting
the number of persons who can initiate an inquiry into sanity, or
by restricting any subsequent proceedings to "reasonable" claims. The
condemned prisoner must be guaranteed at least one hearing upon
the mere suggestion of insanity, and the prisoner or a person acting
on his behalf must be permitted to raise the question without the con-
currence of the warden. It is true that requiring at least one hearing
in every case involving insanity claims will increase administrative
124. See p. 538 supra.
125. The warden or governor may never be satisfied that a prisoner's insanity claim
is a reasonable one and, therefore, may arbitrarily refuse to hold any hearing. See White,
supra note 17, at 243-44 (suggesting that death cell psychosis is natural result of criminal
act and should not be considered in carrying out prescribed sentence). But ci. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical claim
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
126. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 555-59 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
554
Vol. 88: 533, 1979
Insanity of the Condemned
costs. 27 Nonetheless, the important private interest in life, coupled
with the significant risk of error in an arbitrary screening system,12 8
substantially outweighs the administrative justification for limiting
hearings.' 29
The suggestion of insanity itself could most simply and efficiently
be raised by a petition similar in form to a habeas corpus petition.'
3 0
This initial petition would have to allege only that the prisoner is
suspected of being insane.' 3 ' The petition should be directed to the
state executive official or state court judge empowered to suspend
the prisoner's execution; the individual who receives the petition
should be required to postpone the execution and initiate an appro-
priate sanity investigation.
B. The Notice Requirement
Before a condemned prisoner's insanity claim is evaluated, the
prisoner should receive notification that insanity will delay execution.
Moreover, the condemned prisoner should be informed when his in-
sanity claim will be reviewed, the type of proceeding that will
be used, and the standard of insanity that will be employed. 32 Un-
fortunately, traditional forms of notice' 33 are of little value to an
insane prisoner who acts alone. A genuinely insane person can be
expected neither to comprehend fully the manner in which a sanity
investigation will be initiated, nor to understand or challenge the
nature of the sanity inquiry while it is conducted. 3 4 Notice, there-
197. The delay in execution caused by the hearing requirement, however, should not
adversely affect legitimate government interests in imposing the death penalty generally.
See pp. 535-36 supra.
128. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALJF. L. REv. 693, 697-718 (1974) (sanity determinations in
civil commitment hearings are unreliable and invalid).
129. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (government interests not over-
riding because state can minimize costs; substantial private interest in receiving welfare
coupled with great possibility for error "clearly outweighs" state's desire to limit fiscal
and administrative burden).
130. For a summary of the use of habeas corpus, see Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1154 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
men ts].
131. Petitions for subsequent hearings could then be restricted to a higher burden of
proof, inasmuch as the risks of arbitrariness or deprivation of due process decrease once
one full hearing is granted. See pp. 562-63 infra.
132. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (purpose of
notice to advise person of, and permit adequate preparation for, impending hearing).
133. See I M. MERRILL, MERRILL ON NoTcE § 8 (1952) (defining various acts of
notification including formal communication between parties, delivery of document or
letter, and public placement or publication of letter).
134. For a brief discussion of the nature of psychosis, and some of its effects on a
defendant's perception and behavior, see A. GoLnsrEN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 25-33
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fore, cannot realistically be fashioned to the limited capabilities of
an insane prisoner, 135 and some alternative procedure must be em-
ployed to satisfy the due process notice requirement.
One solution is to provide for legal counsel to represent a con-
victed prisoner from the moment his death sentence is imposed until
his execution. 136 The presence of an attorney would assure that a
notice requirement is effective, and would serve to safeguard other
interests of the condemned prisoner.137 The decision whether to re-
quire appointed counsel, however, ultimately hinges on application
of the due process balancing procedure. 38 Nonetheless, when a con-
demned prisoner raises an insanity claim, a significant government
(1967) (although mentally ill defendant may seem to function normally, he may (I) be
unable to interpret or apply rules to his particular situation, (2) be disproportionately
influenced by irrational beliefs or perceptions, and (3) have difficulty handling concepts).
135. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970), quoted in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (opportunity to be heard must be tailored to capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard).
136. In another context, a court held that only counsel has the "capability to examine,
understand, evaluate and challenge the process and the evidence." Miller v. Vitek, 437
F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Neb. 1977), vacated as moot. 98 S. Ct. 2276 (1978) (requiring counsel
whenever prisoners are involuntarily transferred from prison to mental hospital). It may
be suggested that a nonlawyer guardian should represent the allegedly insane prisoner's
interests. But permitting the representation requirement to be satisfied by nonlawyers
deprives the convicted prisoner of the expertise necessary to protect his interests, both
specifically in relation to his insanity claim, see pp. 560-61 infra, and generally in rela-
tion to the evolving legal doctrines implicating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Moreover, legal counsel is already provided to indigent prisoners at the stage of
their first appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), and extension of this
representation to execution would entail less administrative burden and cost than a new
system of nonlegal guardianship.
137. Inasmuch as the same disabilities that undermine adequate notice would also
handicap the prisoner during the insanity hearing, the presence of counsel is necessary
at the hearing to ensure that requisite procedural standard are met, see pp. 560-61
infra, that the proper definition of insanity is used, see pp. 561-62 infra, and that the
condemned prisoner's interests are protected against arbitrary or improper decisions after
the initial hearing both in judicial review proceedings, see pp. 563-64 infra, and in the
determination of subsequent insanity claims.
Moreover, counsel could assist the convicted prisoner in pursuing other postappellate
remedies such as federal or state collateral attacks, petitions for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, and petitions for executive clemency. See Developments, supra
note 130, at 1197-98 (outlining advantages for petitioner and court in appointing counsel
in habeas proceedings); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. Rxv. 1268, 1443-
87 (1968) (arguing that appointment of counsel at each of these postconviction proceed-
ings is constitutionally required).
138. See pp. 546-47 supra. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-89 (1972)
(declining to decide whether parolee is entitled to appointed counsel but noting sub-
stantial liberty interest at stake, strong risk of erroneous decision, and absence of any
state interest in denying all procedural guarantees) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973) (presumptive need for counsel when individual interest augmented by complex
issues and personal handicaps, despite governmental interest in lessening costs and avoid-
ing disruption) with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (declining to require
appointed counsel for convicted prisoners because government correctional goals override
minimal private interest that can adequately be protected by nonlegal assistance).
Vol. 88: 533, 1979
Insanity of the Condemned
interest in reducing costs and in eliminating unnecessary interference
with the sanity determination 39 is outweighed by a strong risk of
error 140 and a substantial private interest that is unlikely to be pro-
tected without counsel. 141 The peculiar circumstances of an alleged-
ly insane condemned prisoner, therefore, provide more compelling
grounds for the appointment of counsel than do the needs of other
prisoners in postappellate proceedings in which the Supreme Court
has refused to require counsel. 42 For the allegedly insane convict, the
notice requirement of the due process clause does not permit another
alternative.
C. The Requirement of a Hearing
Despite suggestions to the contrary, 43 the due process clause does
not require a full, trial-type hearing in every case.144 Like notice, the
139. Cf. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
855 (1976) (denying right to counsel at psychiatric examination because it might defeat
purpose of examination); Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 711 app. (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(denying counsel at pre-indictment psychiatric examination because it would inhibit free
expression and exchange of ideas). Fears of disruption from participation by counsel
might be allayed if the attorney's function at the hearing is redefined so as to encourage
full examination of all the relevant evidence. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney
and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 Ta~x L. REv. 424, 451-57 (1966) (suggesting
new role of attorneys in representing both client and court). But see ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 7 (lawyer should represent client zealously within bounds of law).
140. See note 128 suPra (sanity determinations unreliable and invalid).
141. See pp. 555-57 & note 137 sutra.
142. The Supreme Court's refusal to require counsel in postappellate proceedings
hinges on the belief that such proceedings are not critical stages of a criminal prosecution
in which the assistance of counsel is absolutely necessary to protect the defendant's rights.
In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court held that neither due process nor equal
protection requires the appointment of counsel in discretionary appellate review pro-
ceedings. The Court reasoned that the defendant is adequately protected by pro se review
petitions, supplemented by transcripts and briefs from lower court proceedings. Id. at
610-16.
This rationale has been frequently criticized, particularly in capital cases in which any
proceeding involving the death penalty can be viewed as critical, see Carey v. Garrison,
403 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (Ross v. Moffitt should not apply in capital punish-
ment cases and counsel must be appointed to aid in pursuit of postconviction relief), and
in which the assistance of counsel is regarded as essential to the proper protection of
defendant's rights, see, e.g., H. BEDAU, supra note 67, at 27-31 (refusal to appoint counsel
for postappellate review deprives prisoners of due process by denying them meaningful
access to all available state and federal remedies); Comment, supra note 137, at 1485
(hearing on insanity necessitates appointment of counsel).
143. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950) (implicitly assuming that only con-
ceivable alternative procedure for evaluating insanity claims of condemned prisoners is
full judicial hearing); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405 (1897) (same).
144. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95
(1961) (Fifth Amendment does not require trial-type hearing in every case of government
impairment of private interests); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (pre-
deprivation hearing on termination of welfare benefits need not take form of judicial or
quasi-judicial trial).
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hearing can be tailored to the nature of the interest threatened and
the particular circumstances of the person involved.
The unique predicament of a condemned prisoner, of course, dic-
tates that the hearing precede the termination of his entitlement not
to be executed while insane; his interest cannot be restored after ex-
ecution. x4 5 The form of the hearing, however, may be subject to any
number of variations. Most states presently use variations of three
general types of hearings: discretionary review by one individual,
examination by medical experts, or review by formal adjudication. 140
An evaluation of these general hearing provisions under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments suggests the kinds of legislative provi-
sions that will satisfy constitutional requirements.
Because the only issue to be resolved is the condemned prisoner's
insanity,147 the most appropriate hearing mechanism is an admin-
istrative inquiry conducted before a medical panel of psychiatric
experts. 148 In order to reduce administrative costs, the panel should
optimally consist of only three experts. A panel consisting of less than
three entails unacceptable risks of either arbitrary decisions or un-
resolvable differences in opinion. 49 The panel could be selected on a
rotating basis from a list of qualified psychiatrists retained by the
state for a nominal fee.150 Alternatively, the panel could be composed
of state psychiatrists from local medical hospitals,'5' although any fis-
145. See note 119 supra.
146. See pp. 539-40 supra.
147. The definition of the term "insanity" constitutes a distinct and important issue.
As used in the state statutes, "insanity" signifies a legal conclusion and not a medical
standard. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at 60. There has, however, been substantial
controversy concerning the use of psychiatrists who translate legal definitions into medical
terms. Although this controversy reflects legitimate problems in the use of psychiatrists,
it is beyond the scope of this Note to suggest an alternative to the almost universal
statutory use of the term "insanity." The Note will, however, suggest a standard of in-
sanity designed to clarify the role of the psychiatrist in reviewing a prisoner's insanity
claim. Psychiatrists will not be expected to draw legal conclusions, but are instead to
determine whether the prisoner's condition satisfies more factual, medical standards. See
pp. 561-62 & note 170 infra.
148. Cf. Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 821, 823, 825 (1968) (development of social and psychological sciences makes
possible valuable alternatives to traditional judicial proceedings in certain circumstances).
But see Ennis & Litwack, supra note 128 (nonjudicial determinations should be limited
since there is no evidence of greater reliability or accuracy).
149. But see Project, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice
in Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 61 (1971) (shortage of psychiatrists in all but four most
populous counties of Arizona). In cases of shortages of psychiatrists, an alternative pro-
cedure would have to be considered. See pp. 559-60 infra.
150. Cf. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 2.1-.4 (Approved Draft
1968) (outlining standards for assigned counsel systems, including provisions for assign-
ment, eligibility, rotation, and compensation).
151. States should not be permitted to rely exclusively on nonpsychiatric personnel to
evaluate the convicted prisoner's insanity claim. See note 107 supra (listing states that do
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cal or administrative benefits of this approach would be substantially
undercut by its potential for prejudice. 152
Another approach that is currently employed by a number of
states' 53 requires a formal adjudication of the insanity claim. This
type of hearing has the advantages of easy implementation of pro-
cedures' T4 and, in jury trials, substantial connection to contemporary
community standards. Judicial resolution, however, adds greatly to
the government's administrative burden and fiscal expense, without
any significant additional protection of individual interests. The pris-
oner's entitlement to remain alive while insane should depend en-
tirely on medical opinion that is unlikely to be illuminated by a
judge or jury.15 The addition of a judge or jury only increases the
likelihood of arbitrary rejection of the medical opinion and of er-
roneous evaluation of that opinion.
The third approach currently in use empowers a state executive
official with the authority to conduct the insanity hearing. Although
this solution initially appears to possess the advantages of minimal
administrative burden and expense, it is realistically no more effi-
cient than a medical panel. The state administrator would still have
to rely on psychiatric opinion in order to determine and protect pri-
vate interests adequately.'" Moreover, this option introduces the
greatest potential for error and arbitrariness. As an ongoing participant
not guarantee psychiatric examination); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at 133-34 (in some
states, examinations conducted in state hospitals are sometimes not done by certified
psychiatrists).
152. See Project, supra note 149, at 175-76 & n.139 (overcrowding in state mental
hospitals colors perception of state hospital directors and makes them less likely to ap-
prove prison-to-hospital transfers); cf. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 128, at 726-29 (psy-
chiatric diagnosis is influenced by clinician's personal bias, personality, value system, and
attitudes). But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions in one body does not necessarily create unconstitutional risk of
bias).
153. See pp. 539-40 suPra.
154. Most states can readily borrow the procedural systems employed in civil commit-
ment proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394A67 (1975 & Supp. 1977) (furnishing notice,
appointed counsel, hearing, and right to independent psychiatric expert); W,ASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010-.930 (1975 & Supp. 1977) (providing appointed counsel, choice of
ph)sicians, notice, and hearing that includes right to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses).
155. See Weihofen, A Question of Justice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant,
37 A.B.A.J. 651, 710 (1951) (conclusion of impartial experts accepted by judge or jury in
891 out of 894, and 207 out of 208 cases).
156. In most instances the warden does not possess the sophisticated psychological
trainiig to evaluate the sanity of the prisoner properly. White, supra note 17, at 240
(even in presence of trained psychiatrist, psychotic individual can continue to maintain
seemingly sane behavior). See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, sup~ra note 134, at 25-36 (difficulty
in perceiving and diagnosing psychotic state of defendant).
559
The Yale Law Journal
in the prison, a warden would be vulnerable to systematic bias.1' T
Similarly, a state hospital director might rely on wholly inappropriate
considerations.158 Relying on the authority of a single administrator,
therefore, can only lessen the possibility that the prisoner's claim
will receive objective evaluation.
Regardless of the hearing mechanism chosen, the hearing itself
must be governed by minimal procedural standards that lessen the
potential for arbitrary decisions and guarantee particularized consid-
eration of the prisoner's relevant characteristics. 59 The hearing mech-
anism, therefore, must ensure that the condemned prisoner's present
sanity has been determined recently. His protected entitlement is not
to be executed while insane; consequently, previous psychiatric exami-
nations or evidence should not be dispositive of present sanity. 60
The hearing panel or officer should either conduct an independent
psychiatric examination 6 or allow evidence of present sanity to be
submitted.162 Because errors resulting from the initial hearing are ir-
157. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (person directly involved in
supervising parolee would have great difficulty remaining objective in evaluating his
conduct); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (essential due process need for impartial
decisionmaker).
158. See note 152 supra (overcrowding in state mental hospitals makes hospital
directors less willing to approve prison-to-hospital transfers).
159. See p. 550 supra.
160. Previous adjudications or evaluations of the condemned prisoner's sanity are
"hardly helpful in forming a judgment as to whether there is reasonable doubt as to
the sanity of [the prisoner] ... at a later time." Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839 (1966); see Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal
Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 37-38 (1977)
(method and extent of psychiatric examination differs substantially between test for
competency and test for insanity). It is conceivable that previous diagnoses might be
relevant in some situations, particularly those cases involving chronic mental illness that
are marked by periodic remission or those diseases that are cyclical. See A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 134, at 29-31. In these circumstances, a prior diagnosis might be useful in
substantiating a psychiatrist's present theory. However, the use of prior psychiatric
evidence is generally not well advised because it will rarely be relevant to the proper
test of insanity, see pp. 561-62 infra, and the examinations will rarely be as thorough
as they should be, see Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 & n.2 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (questioning thoroughness of prior insanity examination); Project, supra note
149, at 40-51 (examples of cursory insanity hearings).
161. But see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at 131-40 (problems associated with "im-
partial" appointed psychiatrists and necessity of ensuring that defense is allowed to use
its own expert witnesses). A danger of relying entirely on impartial experts is that their
diagnoses will rarely be seriously questioned, see note 155 supra, even though there is no
consensus among psychiatrists on individual diagnoses. See A. GOLD- IN, supra note 134
at 133; J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 183 (2d ed.
1975) (percentage of agreement among psychiatrists only 54%).
162. There are instances in which the state may have to bear the additional expense
of experts paid to present an indigent prisoner's case. For example, if the panel is com-
posed entirely of state psychiatric officials, the prisoner should be permitted to introduce
independent expert psychiatric opinion.
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reversible, the procedures employed should also guarantee that all
factual findings and assumptions are fully analyzed. Despite govern-
ment interests to the contrary, 1 3 therefore, a prisoner's entitlement
cannot be adequately protected without the assistance of counsel' 64
and an opportunity for that counsel to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. 65 In addition, procedural provisions must couple this re-
duction of error with the minimization of arbitrariness. To accomplish
this, hearing officers should be required to issue a statement of
reasons and to make that statement available to the prisoner's coun-
sel. 1 6 Such a statement entails little additional expense, and it sig-
nificantly safeguards private interests by ensuring that the decision-
maker has complied with the requisite standards and has undertaken
a particularized consideration of the prisoner's character.167
D. A Definition of Insanity
No state procedural scheme can adequately standardize or direct
the sanity determination without defining explicitly the applicable
standard of insanity. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' con-
cern with structured discretion, particularized consideration, and mini-
mization of error demands a definition of insanity tailored to the
needs of this unique proceeding.10 8 Moreover, there is no government
163. See note 139 supra.
164. See pp. 556-57 supra.
165. Due to the importance of the conclusion reached at the hearing, due process
requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); J. Zts~aN, supra note 161, at 304-06 (noting areas of weak-
ness in psychiatric testimony and objectives in effective cross-examination); Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 128, at 743-46 (psychiatric judgments are unreliable and invalid; de-
fendant must be given meaningful opportunity to introduce and cross-examine witnesses).
166. Without such a statement, the state might have to bear the expensive burden of
an additional hearing on the facts, pursuant to a petition for collateral relief. See Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-16 (1963) (requiring federal courts to rehear evidence if
habeas corpus charges cannot be conclusively decided from record).
167. Even if there is no provision for any review, a written record helps to ensure that
administrators will act fairly under the potential scrutiny of state officials and the
public. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (requiring written statement by
fact-finders in.prison disciplinary proceedings of evidence relied upon); Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1291-92 (1975) (other benefits of written
record and statement of reasons).
168. See Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 246, 256 (1950)
(test for insanity should depend on rationale adopted by state in prohibiting execution
of insane); cf. Hazard & Louisell, suPra note 12, at 395 (test should be broad enough to
avoid unnecessary taking of life, yet narrow enough to prevent feigned insanity).
Presently, legal determinations of insanity vary both with the stage of the criminal
prosecution, see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (test for
competency to stand trial is whether defendant can consult with lawyer and understand
proceedings); Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1976) (test for sanity prior
to sentencing is whether defendant can understand nature of proceeding or exercise right
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interest that weighs against the need to formulate a proper standard.
Some states have adopted a test that is particularly directed at the
circumstances of the condemned prisoner. 169 This test requires that
the prisoner understand the nature of the proceedings against him,
the purposes and extent of his punishment, and the fate that awaits
him. Moreover, the prisoner must possess sufficient understanding
to be aware of any facts that may make his punishment unjust, and
have the ability to convey such information to his attorney.170 Such
a standard satisfies the requirements of both the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments because it is tailored to reflect the explanations
commonly given for deferring execution of the insane. 71
E. Procedures for Dealing with Repeated Insanity Claims
The elimination of restrictions on who can raise an insanity claim
and the provision of a full hearing every time such a claim is raised
create substantial concern that the condemned prisoner may take
undue advantage of state procedures. The fear is that the prisoner
will attempt to postpone his execution interminably by feigning in-
to allocution); Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
834 (1970) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (test for competency to plead is whether defendant
can make reasoned choice among alternatives and whether he understands nature of
plea), and with the specific test adopted at each stage, see M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722 (1843), discussed in A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at 45-66 (test for sanity at trial
whether "the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong"); A. GoLDsTIN, supra note
134, at 67-79 (irresistible impulse test for sanity at trial asks whether mental disease
prevented defendant from controlling his conduct); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1 1961), discussed in A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at 86-88 (test
for sanity at trial reviews defendant's "capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law").
None of these tests for insanity, competency, or criminal responsibility, however, relates to
the circumstances of the condemned prisoner's sanity, because neither his prior conduct
nor the cause of his criminal behavior is at issue. Moreover, all these tests fail to address
entirely the bases for the common law exemption against execution. See pp. 535-36 supra.
169. See p. 541 supra. The Supreme Court itself is unlikely to mandate a uniform
test of insanity. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968) ("[F]ormulating a con-
stitutional rule [in insanity cases] would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful ex-
perimentation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry
into a rigid constitutional mold.") The test envisioned here, however, is not a rigid
psychiatric standard. It resembles the competency test adopted by the Court in Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam), see note 168 supra. It is, therefore,
broad enough to apply to other condemned prisoners if changing community standards
or developing medical knowledge permits other prisoners to qualify for the exemption
from execution.
170. An operational definition of insanity for these purposes involves asking the in-
sanity examiner whether the prisoner can in fact communicate with his lawyer and not
whether such a handicap results from a specific mental condition. Although the de-
terminations will still be largely medical, the conclusions will be more factual than legal.
171. See pp. 535-37 supra.
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sanity after every adverse hearing.172 The individual entitlement to
procedural protection, however, diminishes and the government in-
terest in expediting execution becomes more substantial once a pris-
oner's present sanity is fully examined. When the state has provided
one full hearing on the prisoner's insanity claim, therefore, it should
be permitted to review subsequent claims under a more expedited
system.173 A requirement that the expedited review entail a complete
written record of findings would facilitate meaningful judicial review
that could ensure that no genuine insanity claims are ignored.
F. A System of Review
Many present procedural systems do not permit condemned pris-
oners to obtain review of a denial of their insanity claim, either be-
cause the decision not to initiate an inquiry is unreviewable, 17 4 or
because there is no appeal from the insanity determination hearing.175
Such restrictions reflect the government interest in limiting' admin-
istrative and financial costs. These limits also represent an effort to.
preserve the purported deterrent and retributive values of capital
punishment by avoiding the indefinite postponement of executions.
This latter justification is unpersuasive, however, because the execu-
tion of an insane person does not serve any societal justifications for
punishment. 76 Moreover, the government's interest in minimizing ad-
ministrative costs is probably outweighed by the significant risk of
error at the initial hearing.
172. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897) ("it would be wholly at the
will of a convict to suffer any punishment whatever, for the necessity of his doing so
would depend solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of in-
sanity, to be followed by trial upon trial"); Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 551
(1958) (Harlan, J., concurring) (voicing similar fears of "interminable delaying ma-
neuvers").
173. A permissible second system of review might be similar to present state schemes
that require preliminary review by a warden and a hearing only after the demonstration
of a reasonable claim to sanity. See p. 538 supra.
174. E.g., Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), afrd sub nom.
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (warden's decision not to institute sanity
proceedings held unreviewable); N.Y. CORREC. LAw § 654 (McKinney Supp. 1977) ("No
judge, court, or officer, other than the governor, can reprieve or suspend the execution
of a defendant.")
175. E.g., State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 58 P. 248 (1899), aff'd sub nom. Nordstrom
v. Van de Vanter, 181 U.S. 615 (1901) (determination by lower court that defendant was
sane held unreviewable); ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1975) ("mode of suspending the execution
of sentence after conviction on account of the insanity of the convict shall be exclusive
and final and shall not be reviewed or revised by or renewed before any other court or
judge"); see In re Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 838, 186 P.2d 134 (1947), cert. dismissed, 334 U.S. 431
(1948) (no right to judicial determination of sanity upon certification by hospital that
prisoner is sane).
176. See pp. 535-36 sutra.
The Yale Law Journal
Some mechanism for reconsideration of insanity claims is, there-
fore, appropriate. Under current statutory schemes, the two most com-
mon review methods are writs of mandamus directed to the warden 177
and petitions for habeas corpus directed to state or federal courts.17s
Under the proposed statutory schemes, however, hearings must be
conducted in every case, so mandamus is no longer relevant. The
habeas corpus petition, on the other hand, should continue to be
encouraged. It is a relatively uncomplicated and efficient system of
review"79 that can usually be performed ex parte in both state and
federal courts.' 80 By providing for the use of habeas corpus in cases
concerning condemned prisoners' insanity claims, it will be more likely
that the reasons given by the hearing examiner for his decision will
reflect reliance on proper procedural and substantive standards.
Conclusion
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has consistently extended
procedural due process protection to individuals threatened with the
deprivation of private interests, including those individuals threatened
with the death penalty. These protections must be extended to those
prisoners who have been granted a common law or statutory entitle-
ment to remain alive while insane. This entitlement, like other sub-
stantial private interests, is governed by the due process clause. Only
a statutory framework similar to that outlined in this Note will guar-
antee that the requirements of due process are satisfied.
177. See Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948) (dismissing habeas corpus request for
judicial determination of sanity because state remedy of mandamus was still available to
compel warden to initiate judicial proceedings). But see Hazard & Louisell, supra note
12, at 390 (even when mandamus is available, applicant may be required to demonstrate
prima facie case of insanity before hearing will be granted).
178. See In re Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 838, 851-61, 186 P.2d 134, 142-47 (1947), cert. dismissed,
334 U.S. 431 (1948) (Schauer, J., dissenting) (habeas corpus petition is proper procedure
for challenging return to prison upon restoration to sanity); cf. Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) (allowing state prisoner to challenge conditions of his
confinement by federal habeas corpus petition, even though he had not exhausted all
available state remedies).
179. See Developments, supra note 130, at 1041, 1174 n.132 (administrative burden of
habeas petitions very slight due to usual quick dismissal with brief or no hearing).
180. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970) (federal habeas corpus procedure). A state
prisoner, however, must first exhaust available state remedies, including state collateral
relief. Id. § 2254(b); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (absent constitutional claim of innocence, federal habeas review should con-
sider only whether fair opportunity was provided to raise claim in state courts).
564
Vol. 88: 533, 1979
